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A core challenge for contemporary bioethics is how to address the tension between respecting an 
individual’s autonomy and promoting their wellbeing when these ideals seem to come into conflict 
(Notini et al. 2020). This tension is often reflected in discussions of the ethical status of 
guardianship and other surrogate decision-making regimes for individuals with different kinds or 
degrees of cognitive ability and (hence) decision-making capacity (Earp and Grunt-Mejer 2021), 
specifically when these capacities are regarded as diminished or impaired along certain dimensions 
(or with respect to certain domains). The notion or practice of guardianship, wherein a guardian is 
legally appointed to make decisions on behalf of someone with different/diminished capacities, 
has been particularly controversial. For example, many people see guardianship as unjust, taking 
too much decisional authority away from the person under the guardian’s care (often due to 
prejudiced attitudes, as when people with certain disabilities are wrongly assumed to lack decision-
making capacity); and as too rigid, for example, in making a blanket judgment about someone’s 
(lack of) capacity, thereby preventing them from making decisions even in areas where they have 
the requisite abilities (Glen 2015).  
It is against this backdrop that Paterson, Karlawish, and Largent (2021) offer a useful philosophical 
framework for the notion of ‘supported decision-making’ as a compelling alternative for 
individuals with ‘dynamic impairments’ (i.e., non-static or domain-variant perceived impairments 
in decision-making capacity). In a similar spirit, we have previously argued that bioethics would 
benefit from a more case-sensitive rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach when it comes to issues 
of cognitive diversity (Veit et al. 2020; Chapman and Veit 2020). We therefore agree with most of 
the authors’ defence of supported decision-making, as this approach allows for case- and context-
sensitivity. We also agree with the authors that the categorical condemnation of guardianships or 
similar arrangements is not justified, as this precludes such sensitivity. For instance, as the authors 
note, if a patient is in a permanent unaware/unresponsive state – i.e., with no current or foreseeable 
decision-making capacity or ability to exercise autonomy – then a guardianship-like regime may be 
the most appropriate means of promoting this person’s interests. A similar point can be made in 
relation to debates about intended human enhancement of embryos and children. Although some 
critics claim that such interventions violate the autonomy of the enhanced person, proponents 
may argue that respect for autonomy and consent do not apply in certain cases, for example, when 
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dealing with embryos (see Veit 2018); alternatively, they may argue that interventions to enhance 
the (future) autonomy of a currently pre-autonomous (or partially autonomous) being can be 
justified on an enhancement framework without falling prey to such objections (see Earp 2019, 
Maslen et al. 2014). 
An issue the authors raise, but do not discuss in detail, is the question of potential trade-offs 
between respect for autonomy (commensurate with the kind or degree of autonomy the agent has, 
either alone or as part of a supported decision-making unit) and the need to protect those who 
may not act in their own best interest due to compromised decision-making capacity. What should 
be done in cases where an agent’s decisions (i) seem not to reflect what is in their best interest and 
(ii) could be improved upon (in the sense of better promoting their wellbeing) through an 
intervention that restricts their autonomy (or exercise thereof)? These conflicts and trade-offs need 
to be made more explicit if we are to determine which surrogate decision-making regimes are best 
for different cases.  
One point needs to be made right away. In general, respecting a person’s autonomy does not entail 
a conflict or trade-off with promoting their wellbeing. Instead, on various theories of human 
wellbeing, the very ability to make decisions about one’s own life without undue interference from 
others is a major component of, or at least contributor to, wellbeing. Thus, even if respecting 
someone’s apparently misguided decision (after all appropriate efforts to dissuade the person have 
failed) seems likely to bring adverse consequences for the decider in a specific domain, it will often 
still be the case that they should be left to make the putatively ‘bad’ decision: not only out of 
respect for their autonomy, but also on grounds of their overall well-being (for example, so that 
they can learn from their mistakes or otherwise develop their decision-making capacities over the 
long run). Importantly, this argument does not just apply to those people deemed ‘fully’ 
autonomous with respect to some relevant standard, such as a mature, neurotypical adult of sound 
mind; it also applies to those with ‘developing’ autonomy, such as children, whose very ability to 
become ‘fully’ autonomous will often require that their (primarily self-affecting) decisions be 
respected even when a different decision would be more prudent.  
A similar lesson may apply to those with cognitive impairments, at least in certain cases. 
Specifically, when considering how to evaluate the decisions of someone “on the margins of 
autonomy” (Paterson et al., 2021), it is important not simply to assume that there is, in fact, a 
conflict between respecting their autonomy (again, commensurate with the kind or degree of 
autonomy they have) and promoting their wellbeing. In some cases, we suggest, allowing someone 
to make an apparently ‘bad’ decision (i.e., one that is not in their immediate best interests) will be 
justified both as a matter of respect for them as a person and as something that is compatible with, 
and may even promote, their overall wellbeing. By the same token, overriding someone’s 
decision(s) out of a concern for their best interests can sometimes, ironically, reduce their overall 
wellbeing, in part by undermining whatever autonomy they have.  
That being said, there will undoubtedly be cases in a which a person’s decision-making capacity 
(with respect to some domain or issue) is genuinely impaired, and where respecting their decision 
out of a concern for their – diminished – autonomy will in fact come at cost to their overall 
wellbeing, possibly to such an extent that the decision cannot in good conscience be allowed to 
stand (e.g. allowing a ‘punch-drunk’ boxer to fight; Veit & Browning forthcoming). Of course, 
whether a situation falls under this description will often be a difficult judgment call, and we can’t 
hope to offer a general account of how to adjudicate such matters here. Instead, we simply want 
to flag two factors that should feed into such deliberations: (i) the need for case-sensitivity, with 
respect to which any genuine trade-offs between autonomy and wellbeing are made explicit, and 
(ii) the need to treat autonomy in a gradualist, rather than binary manner that reflects the cognitive 
diversity of actual agents. This is not to say that case-sensitivity will eliminate all disagreement, but 
that we will at least have a better understanding of what is at stake in particular situations when 
trying to find the best compromises between different desiderata. 
Describing these trade-offs will in part require a clearer understanding of the reasons for giving 
weight to autonomy in the first place. Autonomy is typically taken to be valuable for a number of 
reasons, some of which plausibly reduce to its instrumental value in promoting wellbeing, but 
some of which do not. For example, autonomy can be valuable because it allows an agent to choose 
the ends which they recognize to be best for themselves2 (including ends other than happiness or 
wellbeing); and it may be objectively valuable or valuable in itself.  
A potential constraint on the value of autonomy, however, is that should incline the decider toward 
choices that are, not random or whimsical, but rather, well-informed and rationally derived. 
According to this perspective, the value of autonomy declines as an agent becomes more 
cognitively impaired such that (i.e., as a result of the impairment) their ability to identify and choose 
those ends that really are best for them – even by their own lights – likewise declines. In such a 
scenario, the principle of beneficence may come to supersede autonomy in determining what is in 
a person’s best interest. It may also allow for an agent’s choices to be overridden in some cases 
without thereby treating the agent as mere means.  
In any event, taking a case-sensitive approach requires that we cannot treat autonomy as equally 
relevant (or valuable) in all cases. Although this may seem evident in some circumstances, such as 
when considering the interests of comatose patients, autonomy is still often treated as a property 
that agents either have or lack, rather than something that comes in degrees (or as something which 
different agents may reasonably value to a greater or lesser extent). This seems to us to be a mistake. 
In the complete absence of decision-making capacity we must rely on considerations of wellbeing 
(or where possible, substituted judgment), but once there is some degree of autonomy this should 
be recognized and perhaps further enhanced, along the lines suggested by Paterson, Karlawish, 
and Largent (2021) in their proposal regarding supported decision-making.  
It is also critical to keep in mind that an agent may continue to value their own (even diminished) 
autonomy, even if this makes their lives harder and decreases their quality of life. Accordingly, we 
may require methods of measuring an agent’s autonomy and how much they value it in order to clarify 
the trade-offs between autonomy and wellbeing where applicable and to help us determine which 
surrogate decision-making procedures are likely to be most appropriate. Autonomy may not be 
valued equally by all agents; and the degree to which one values it may also not covary precisely 
 
2 Utilitarians such as John Stuart Mill have long emphasized the importance of autonomy precisely because 
individual agents (albeit availed of advice from their relational networks) are typically better positioned to know what 
is best for them, rather than, say, the government. For further discussion with qualifications, see the section 
“Autonomy as an ethical tool” (p. 75) in Earp and Savulescu (2020). 
with one’s capacity to exercise it. It is thus important to establish not only how much autonomy 
an agent with decision-making impairments has (or will have in the context of adequate support), 
but also how much they value their continued ability for self-determination.3  
In the end, we believe we can advance the goals of supported decision-making by calling for a 
more pluralistic approach that recognizes the cognitive diversity of actual humans, while also 
emphasizing the need to make more explicit the process by which weights are assigned (ideally on 
a case-by-case basis) to considerations of autonomy and wellbeing insofar as these conflict.  
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